“Not working would mean admitting inferiority” – Italian ex-pro dissects Van der Poel’s Flanders dilemma before Pogacar rematch at Paris-Roubaix

The debate that followed the 2026 Tour of Flanders has refused to fade, but the focus has already shifted to what comes next. As Mathieu van der Poel prepares to face Tadej Pogacar again at this weekend’s Paris-Roubaix, his decision to work alongside the Slovenian in Belgium continues to divide opinion, raising fresh questions over how he can approach the next chapter of their rivalry.

Now, former professional Moreno Moser has offered a more nuanced explanation of that choice, framing it not simply as a tactical call, but as something far more human.

“In commentary, I simply observed the situation, because I also sit somewhere in the middle,” Moser said in conversation with Bici.Pro. “Van der Poel works because he doesn’t want to feel inferior. Not doing so would mean admitting he is inferior.”

It is a line that cuts straight to the heart of the Flanders controversy. In a race where Pogacar ultimately proved the strongest on the Oude Kwaremont, the question was not only whether Van der Poel could win, but whether he was willing to race in a way that suggested he could not.

At first glance, the criticism appears straightforward. By contributing to the pace, Van der Poel helped maintain a rhythm that suited Pogacar, allowing the Slovenian to launch his now-familiar race-winning move from a position of control. Analysts and former riders pointed to alternative scenarios, where disrupting the cooperation might have opened the door for others to return.

Moser sees that possibility too, but stops short of calling it a mistake. “If Van der Poel hadn’t worked, he might have irritated Pogacar and maybe Evenepoel could have come back and even attacked,” he explained. “Different dynamics could have developed. By working, instead, you create the scenario where the strongest rider simply holds on. And since the strongest was Tadej, then yes…”

That theoretical alternative, however, comes with its own risk. “You also have to consider that if you stop working, you risk being dropped at the first acceleration,” Moser added. “If you start being clever, don’t work, and then lose anyway, you look bad.”

There is also a more immediate cost to the path Van der Poel chose. “By choosing to work with Pogacar, Van der Poel spent the energy he had left, and he paid for it on the Kwaremont.”

It is a dilemma that has become increasingly familiar in races featuring Pogacar. His ability to sustain repeated high-intensity efforts has, in many cases, reduced tactical variation to a narrow band of choices, each carrying its own risk.

There is also a more uncomfortable layer to the discussion. For all the focus on tactics, Moser suggests the outcome in Flanders may have been largely predetermined by physical difference rather than strategic nuance. “If Flanders had been raced on Zwift, the result would have been the same,” he said. “If you measured the watts per kilo, you would get the same finishing order, or very close.”

That assessment aligns with a growing sentiment within the peloton. Pogacar’s performances in the cobbled Classics have not only delivered results, but also reshaped how those races are approached. Traditional ideas of sitting on, disrupting rhythm or forcing alliances have become harder to execute when one rider can simply ride away regardless.

Van der Poel’s decision, in that context, becomes less about error and more about limitation. He committed to the move, used the legs he had, and reached the decisive moment, believing he could still match his rival. “Compared to last year, he held on much better on the Kwaremont,” Moser said. “He arrived at the key moment convinced he wouldn’t be dropped. And even Pogacar had to go very deep to drop him.”

There was also a practical logic behind not allowing the race to reset. “Everyone I’ve dropped is behind — why would I bring them back?”

The conversation now shifts to what comes next. This weekend’s Paris-Roubaix presents a different kind of challenge, one that could reopen tactical possibilities that felt closed in Flanders. “I think he’ll win Roubaix,” Moser said of Van der Poel. “Maybe he won’t drop him on the cobbles, but in a sprint, he is superior.”

That belief is rooted in the nature of the race itself. Where Flanders has increasingly been decided by explosive efforts on climbs like the Kwaremont, Roubaix offers a longer, more chaotic test, where positioning, endurance and mechanical resilience all play a role. “No matter how strong you are, it’s harder to drop riders from the wheel,” Moser explained. “Roubaix has 150 kilometres of tension. It’s a different race.”

It is also a race where the tactical picture is less rigid. More riders are likely to remain in contention deeper into the finale, creating scenarios where cooperation, hesitation or opportunism can have a greater impact.

That leaves Van der Poel with a familiar question, but in a new setting. Does he race Pogacar in the same way, committing fully and backing his strength? Or does he lean into the uncertainty of Roubaix and explore the kind of disruption that was only theoretical in Flanders?

Moser’s analysis suggests the answer may again come down to instinct rather than calculation. “He’s probably very proud, and pride can sometimes be a weakness rather than a strength.”

Because in a rivalry increasingly defined by fine margins and overwhelming strength, the hardest decision may not be how to beat Pogacar, but how much a rider is willing to risk in trying.