Opinion: France’s AFLD must explain why specifically Tadej Pogačar and Jonas Vingegaard were selected — and not Paul Seixas

Doping controls are indispensable in professional cycling and the Tour de France. No one who demands a credible and clean competition can seriously argue that Tadej Pogacar, Jonas Vingegaard, or other top riders should be tested less. It is precisely the best who must expect to be at the center of the testing system at any time.

But a test at 2 a.m. is not a routine check. Under French regulations, it is an exceptional intervention that requires significantly stricter conditions than a visit early in the morning or in the evening.

That is why it is not enough to dismiss the case with the blanket statement that professional athletes must be prepared for doping controls around the clock. Formally, that is only partly true. Anyone who looks at the differences between the UCI rulebook and French sports law will see why this control raises questions.

The UCI generally assumes that tests take place between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. A test between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. is possible, but it requires “valid grounds,” meaning compelling or substantial reasons. At the same time, the regulations maintain that a rider can, in principle, be asked to provide a sample at any time and anywhere. He may not refuse the test solely because it takes place outside usual hours.

This means: A test at 2 a.m. is not automatically inadmissible under UCI rules. But it is by no means intended as a normal standard measure either. The exceptional timing requires an exceptional justification.

Since the test in France is said to have been carried out by the national anti-doping agency AFLD, French sports law is the key factor.

Under Article L232-14 of the French Code du sport, testers may generally enter residential and accommodation premises only between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. Special exceptions apply to tests in hotels or private accommodations between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m.

Between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m., a general justification is not sufficient. The law additionally requires “serious and concordant indications” that the athlete has violated or will violate anti-doping regulations. There must also be a risk that evidence could disappear. The measure must remain proportionate and respect the athlete’s privacy.

In addition, such a night test may only be conducted if the athlete has previously given consent to the AFLD or the competent international sports federation. This consent must be in writing and can be obtained, for example, when being included in a testing pool or when registering for an international event.

However, this consent is not a blank check. It merely answers the question of whether a test at night may, in principle, be conducted. For a specific test at 2 a.m., the additional requirements still appear to have to be met under French law.

This is where the real problem arises. It is not the fact that Pogacar and Vingegaard were tested that leads to speculation. It is the exceptional timing combined with the exceptionally high legal threshold.

If French law requires serious and concordant indications, as well as a risk of loss of evidence, for tests between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m., the inevitable question is why the AFLD deemed a test at 2 a.m. necessary.

This is not an accusation against Pogacar or Vingegaard. A doping control is not a positive test and not proof of wrongdoing. It must not be portrayed journalistically as an indirect attribution of guilt.

But by the same token, one cannot expect the public, teams, and riders to regard such an unusual measure as a trivial routine.

By choosing this timing, the AFLD itself created a context in which questions are inevitable. If it remains completely silent about the reasons, an information vacuum arises. And that vacuum will inevitably be filled with conjecture.

The selection would require particular explanation if, in fact, only Pogačar and Vingegaard were tested during the night.

Both have dominated the Tour de France for years and are the race’s most prominent riders. More frequent tests would therefore be understandable in principle. Targeted tests are also explicitly part of the international anti-doping system. The UCI cites, among other things, exceptional performances, performance developments, testing histories, and available information as possible criteria for target testing.

But Paul Seixas is also well placed in the general classification. The 19-year-old Frenchman was in fourth place after stage 14 and led the young rider classification.

If the night-time control was ordered solely due to athletic standing and exceptional performances, the legitimate question arises as to why Seixas was not tested at the same time. The same could apply to Remco Evenepoel or Florian Lipowitz from the immediate leading group.

There may be a completely plausible explanation for this. The selection may have been based on specific biological passport data, earlier testing times, concrete information, or a coordinated testing strategy. Perhaps other riders were tested at other times without this being made public.

But as long as the AFLD does not explain anything, that remains speculation.

The fact that the French top rider in particular is said not to have been among the named riders makes the situation particularly delicate politically and athletically.

This does not mean that the AFLD deliberately protected Seixas. There is no solid evidence for such a claim. National anti-doping agencies must operate independently, and without knowledge of the testing plan, such an accusation would be unfounded.

Nevertheless, the AFLD must be aware of how this selection appears from the outside. When two foreign Tour favorites are woken in the middle of the night while the most successful French GC rider is apparently not part of the same measure, it creates the impression of unequal treatment—even if the actual reasons were purely technical.

A national authority in particular should avoid any appearance of treating domestic and foreign riders by different standards.

The best answer would be transparency, insofar as it is possible without compromising ongoing investigations or the testing system.

Of course, an anti-doping agency cannot publish all the reasons for targeted tests. It must not disclose confidential information, biological data, or lines of investigation. Surprise and secrecy are essential components of an effective testing system.

However, the AFLD could at least explain the legal basis.

It could confirm under which jurisdiction the tests were ordered, whether they were in fact AFLD controls, and whether the conditions of Articles L232-14-1 to L232-14-3 were applied. It could also clarify whether other riders were tested the same night or within a comparable timeframe, without naming them.

Above all, it must be clarified whether the often-cited time of 2 a.m. actually marks the start of the control, or whether a previously initiated procedure extended until that time. This distinction would be significant from both a legal and journalistic standpoint.

This transparency would not only be in the public interest. It would also be fair to the two riders.

As long as phrases like “serious and consistent grounds for suspicion” are circulating without the specific legal context being explained, it can create the impression that the control was carried out due to an individual suspicion of doping.

That need not have been the case. The provisions may be applied differently depending on the competent organization, prior consent, the specific testing mandate, and the actual sequence of events. It would therefore be dangerous to infer a suspicion against Pogačar or Vingegaard directly from the legal text.

That is precisely why the responsible authority should contextualize the process.

In the fight against doping, there can be no comfort zone. Cycling’s stars should be protected from neither unpleasant tests by their name nor by their sporting significance.

But a strict testing system earns its credibility not only through toughness. It also earns it through proportionality, equal treatment, and transparent procedures.

A control at 2 a.m. intrudes deeply into a rider’s recovery and privacy. During a Grand Tour, sleep is not a side issue but a central part of physical performance. That is why the French legislature has deliberately created high thresholds for such measures.

If the AFLD considered these thresholds to be met, there must have been a weighty reason. The public has no right to confidential investigative details. But it can expect the authority to explain why such an exceptional measure was, in principle, necessary and proportionate.

Until that happens, questions remain: Why at 2 a.m.? Why Pogacar and Vingegaard? Why apparently not Seixas or other riders from the front group?

Asking these questions is neither a conspiracy theory nor an attack on anti-doping efforts. Quite the opposite: anyone who wants a powerful and credible testing system must also demand that exceptional intrusions be carried out according to clear and equal standards.